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  1CONFLICT, WAGES, AND MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA 
 
Abstract 
Firms’ compensation practices affect the protection of investors’ interests and the degree of 
economic inequality by changing the stakes of engaging in appropriation activities versus 
respecting the status quo. We use a general equilibrium model where workers can either work 
peacefully or join a guerrilla movement that expropriates entrepreneurs. If workers are peaceful, 
they receive a competitive wage. If they join a guerrilla movement, they receive a share of the 
appropriated wealth, which depends positively on the number of guerrilla members. In this 
framework, we find one low-income, low-wage equilibrium with guerrilla activity and one 
peaceful, high-income, high-wage equilibrium. The peaceful equilibrium can be reached through 
redistribution policies, which can be implemented at the firm level. In essence, through their 
compensation policies entrepreneurs, not the state might be able to protect their assets against 
expropriation and simultaneously control the internal principal-agent problem.  
 
Key words: conflict; efficiency wages; general equilibrium; income distribution; multiple 
equilibria 
  2Introduction 
Governments have always been held accountable for reforms leading to improved wealth 
distribution and social peace while very little attention has been paid to private, firm-level 
initiatives that can improve general economic conditions and reduce inequality and social 
conflict. This is probably because the relevant research is carried out in countries whose 
governments are at least moderately effective and trustworthy. Complex institutional and 
redistribution reforms, however, are mostly needed in places where governments are weak and 
ineffective, where entrepreneurs suffer from expropriation or have to invest in private 
mechanisms to protect their assets. We argue that in such environments the actions of individual 
entrepreneurs can be an effective, alternative way to reach the same outcomes as with ambitious, 
government-led reforms. We argue that firms’ compensation practices affect the protection of 
investors’ interests and the degree of economic inequality and social conflict by changing the 
stakes of engaging in expropriation activities. By implementing standard remedies for the internal 
principal-agent problem such as paying efficiency wages (unusually high wages), entrepreneurs 
successfully align the workers’ incentives with the status quo distribution of resources, thus 
eliminating the source of social conflict.         
Following Grossman (1991) we present a general equilibrium model where workers can 
either work or join illegal armed groups that appropriate entrepreneurs’ assets. If workers engage 
in legal activities they receive a competitive wage. If they join a guerrilla group, they receive part 
of the income derived from appropriation. The share of output that is appropriated depends 
positively on the number of guerrillas. Without loss of generality, we assume that agents take the 
government as an exogenous variable. In addition, we assume that conflict, that is appropriation, 
is linked to the existence of two economic classes differentiated by the endowment of productive 
  3assets: workers do not own land or physical capital, and firm owners do not work. If workers join 
a guerrilla movement, they receive a share of the income derived from appropriation. The share 
of output that is appropriated positively depends on the number of guerrilla members. Using this 
framework, we find that there are two equilibria: one low-income, low-wage equilibrium with 
guerrilla activities and one peaceful, high-income, high-wage equilibrium. These multiple 
equilibria exist because the marginal productivity of labor decreases for each firm, but in the 
aggregate it might increase because the number of workers is negatively correlated with the 
number of guerrillas. Consequently, the share of output that is appropriated by guerrillas depends 
negatively on the number of workers. We show that under certain condition the actions of the 
individual entrepreneurs can lead to the peaceful, high-income, high-wage equilibrium.
1
In this setting, a coordination problem arises where a general increase in wages would 
benefit each firm but no individual firm has incentives to increase wages by itself unless it can 
simultaneously alleviate the internal principle-agent problem. There is therefore some room for 
government intervention. Any policy designed to reduce the number of guerrillas reduces the 
share of output that is appropriated and, consequently, increases the actual marginal productivity 
of labor. In particular, both strengthening legal institutions and increasing social expenditure can 
help achieve the high-income, high-wage equilibrium. The successful implementation of these 
policies, however, requires considerable resources and government accountability that are 
generally lacking in places where social conflict prevails.
2    
An alternative way is to rely on private initiative. Efficiency wages are a tool that private 
firms can use to increase labor productivity at the firm level by alleviating the internal principal-
                                                 
1 Multiple equilibria are also present in the model proposed by Zuleta (2004). However, he does not consider the 
possibility of private actions conducing to the best equilibrium.  
  4agent problem.
3 In addition, in an adverse business environment characterized by expropriation, 
this tool can also change the payoff of respecting the status quo versus participating in guerrilla 
groups. Indeed, if private firms have incentives to individually increase wages the high-income, 
high-wage equilibrium can be achieved without government intervention. So, there are firm-level 
economically viable mechanisms that have strong beneficial effects on both business climate and 
social conflict and in this paper we discuss firms’ incentives for using this mechanism.  To the 
best of our knowledge, the possibility of increasing returns to labor has not been addressed in the 
literature as the driving force behind multiple equilibria and rising wages and as a way of 
redistributing wealth and resolving conflicts.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the relevant 
literature on economic conflict. Then we present the basic model and its results. Next, we 
introduce efficiency wages and show that if firms implement this compensation policy the 
peaceful, high-income, high-wage equilibrium is achieved. Finally, we discuss some policy 
implications. 
Economic Conflict and Property Rights Enforcement   
In many developing and transition countries, the process of property rights creation is far 
from complete and their enforcement is costly and complex. Grossman (2001) proposes a 
framework that analyzes a situation in which valuable resources are initially allocated to a 
common pool and economic agents create effective property rights by investing time and effort to 
appropriate a share from the common pool. Another version of this model treats agents as if 
                                                                                                                                                              
2 A number of authors argue that some degree of redistribution is needed so that the peaceful equilibrium prevails 
(Azam, 2002; Diaz, 2000; Rodriguez, 2004; Roemer, 1998).   
  5initially they had claims to the valuable resources. The amount of time and effort devoted to 
defending and challenging initial claims depends on the relative importance of resources for 
producing consumable goods. In the end, the equilibrium security of the claims depends on the 
effectiveness of the time and effort allocated to challenging initial property rights relative to the 
time and effort allocated to defending initial claims. The same basic model can be found in the 
works of Skaperdas (1992) and Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997), who study the case of two 
agents who can invest in productive activities or in appropriative activities. They find that the 
agent, whose productivity in the production of goods is lower than in the appropriative activity, 
will invest more in appropriative activities and will expand its military power. In general, 
spontaneous creation of property rights and their effective enforcement depend on the time and 
effort people put into economic activities that are supportive of the status quo versus the time and 
effort they put into activities that disturb stability and current order. Using this rationale, we 
envisage three ways whereby property rights over firms’ assets can be enforced. Firstly, by 
making state enforcement institutions such as the police, army and courts more effective in order 
to reduce the expected income from unpunished expropriation. Secondly, by increasing social 
expenditure and eliminating poverty to decrease incentives for expropriation. Finally, by 
increasing returns on behavior respectful to investors’ interests by using firm-level human 
resources policies such as efficiency wages that increase the opportunity cost of expropriation.
4
Improvements in enforcement institutions such as the police, judiciary, army and jail 
infrastructure make capital assets less vulnerable to manipulation and increase their value, 
negatively affecting the expected income of appropriative behavior. The creation of strong 
                                                                                                                                                              
3 Efficiency wages are not the only mechanism private firms can use to control principal-agent problems. Another 
mechanism described in the literature is shared ownership. See Rousseau and Shperling (2003) for a recent treatment 
of ownership sharing in knowledge intensive firms where shirking is particularly costly and difficult to control.   
4 For a detailed discussion, see Andonova and Zuleta (2007). 
  6institutions for property rights enforcement, however, is characterized by large fixed costs and 
indivisibilities. The large set-up cost of effective law enforcement institutions often outweighs 
their short-term benefits and, as a result, weak enforcement of property rights might be persistent. 
It is possible, however, to break down this short-term equilibrium if there is learning-by-doing in 
the appropriative activities, because soon the cost of effective enforcement institutions falls 
below the total damages inflicted by expropriation (Zuleta, 2004). 
Increases in social expenditure in the form of poverty reduction programs and 
improvements in income distribution are alternative ways of dealing with social conflict and 
investor expropriation. These actions maintain a favorable business climate as they lead to an 
increase in the expected income of licit behavior. As a result, workers are interested in supporting 
the status quo instead of challenging established property rights. This argument has also been 
recently made with regard to terrorism by Burgoon (2006).  
Finally, a mechanism enabling firms, rather than governments, to directly affect workers’ 
incentives for participating in appropriative activities, is to increase the returns of behavior that is 
respectful of property rights. Private investors thus become the driving force that encourages 
workers to respect rather than challenge the status quo. For this strategy to be effective, however, 
firms must derive private benefits from the use of mechanisms such as efficiency wages. We 
argue that such private benefits might exist because by using efficiency wages, entrepreneurs 
address the principal-agent problem and simultaneously protect their assets in an environment 
with weak property rights enforcement. 
Under the framework proposed here, the existence of a guerilla movement and its size 
depend on the functional distribution of income. Indeed, the opportunity cost of becoming a 
guerrilla is the wage of a legal worker. The income of a legal worker is the labor income share 
  7multiplied by the income per worker while the income of a guerrilla is the appropriated share 
multiplied by the income per guerrilla. Therefore, the higher the labor income share the lower the 
incentives to join guerrilla groups. The real-world validity of this mechanism is supported by 
extensive empirical evidence. Myers (1984), for example, finds that better wages and 
employment reduce individual recidivism rates. Collier and Hoeffler (1991) argue that countries 
with low income levels and high demographic growth are more likely to suffer economic 
conflicts and emphasize that in these countries the recruitment for illegal groups is cheaper. For 
the case of Colombia Velez, Leibovich, Kugler, Buillon and Nuñez (2000) show that the growth 
of guerrillas is positively correlated with an increase in income inequality. In the following 
section we formally present the model and discuss its implications.  
The Model 
We consider a static set-up, where the stock of productive assets (K) is given, as well as 
the number of potential workers (N). This assumption simplifies the model. Nevertheless, we are 
aware of ignoring the dynamic gains derived from the peaceful environment in such a way that 
our static model underestimates the positive effects of incentive compatible compensation 
schemes.  
In this model, firms use productive assets and labor (L) as inputs and produce a single 
final good. The guerrilla movement uses only one input, labor (Lg) and appropriates a share φ of 
the firm’s output. All agents are utility-maximizers. Given that the model is a static one-good 
model, we do not need to consider a specific utility function. We just assume that agents prefer 
more rather than less, so labor mobility guarantees that wages are equal for guerrillas and 
workers. 
  8Firms 
The production function is Cobb-Douglas and combines labor (L) and capital (K). The 
guerrilla movement appropriates a share of the output. Thus, firms maximize profits, 
), ) 1 max((
1 rK wL L AK − − −
−α α φ  
where φ is the share of output appropriated by the guerilla movement. Firms take capital 
and wages as given and choose the optimal quantity of labor. Therefore, factor prices are 
determined by their marginal productivity, namely,     
α α φ Ak w ) 1 )( 1 ( − − =            ( 1 )  
1 ) 1 (
− − =
α α φ Ak r            ( 2 )  
where k is the capital labor ratio (k=K/L). 
These are standard results but here the actual total factor productivity is given by (1- φ)A, 
so both labor income and capital income depend negatively on the share appropriated by 
guerillas. 
Workers, Guerrillas and Labor Mobility 
The income from guerrilla activity is perfectly distributed, so the income of each member 
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where L denotes the number of workers and Lg the number of guerrilla members. Since 
there is labor mobility, we can use equations (1) and (3) to derive the ratio of workers to 
guerrillas, 
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We assume a population size of N, where L+Lg=N and 
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Equations (5) and (5a) are equilibrium conditions given the effectiveness of the guerrilla 
movement (φ). 
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, then wg < w, so guerrillas move to firms. 
Thus, given φ the equilibrium is stable. 
From equations (4), (5) and (5a), given the population, the number of guerrillas depends 
positively on the efficiency of the guerrillas and the capital income share, and negatively on the 
labor income share. An increase in φ reduces the income of workers and increases the income of 
guerrillas. An increase in α reduces the income of workers because it reduces the labor income 
share and does not affect the income of guerrillas. So, an increase in either φ or α creates 
incentives to quit legal jobs and join guerrilla movements.  An increase in α is a redistribution of 
income against workers, which reduces the relative income of legal workers and generates 
  10incentives to quit legal jobs. In the same way, an increase in φ results in a redistribution of 
income in favor of guerrillas, generating incentives to join guerrilla movements.  
Guerrilla Effectiveness  
We have so far treated the share of the output that guerrillas can appropriate (φ) as 
exogenous. Below we endogenize φ by assuming that the share of output that guerrillas can 
appropriate depends on the number of its members. We also assume that a minimum size is 
needed for guerrillas to operate that is, the guerrilla movement faces a fixed cost. Under these 
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G , G(1) = 0 and G(0) < 1+ X. Therefore, there is a share of the 
output that cannot be appropriated by the guerrillas no matter how big and strong the guerrilla 
movement is (φ < 1). Note also that N (1-G
-1 (X)) is the minimum amount of guerrillas needed to 
operate. 
Equation (6) shows the share of output appropriated by guerrillas given the allocation of 
workers, while equation (5) shows the equilibrium allocation of workers given the effectiveness 
of the guerrilla movement. Therefore, we can use equations (5) and (6) to find the equilibrium 
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 increases. The left hand side is linear while the 
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,  the right hand side of equation (7) 
depends negatively on the capital share α so, the possibility of multiple equilibria depends on the 
capital intensity of the technology (the proof is presented in the Section A1 of the Appendix).  
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the possibility of multiple equilibria in a graphical way (φ and 
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[Insert figures 1 and 2] 
•  In figure 1 we assume that labor income share is big. There is one equilibrium where Lg = 
0 and φ = 0. In this case, the equilibrium is the high-income, high-wage one, and there is no room 
for improvements. 
 





















, is stable and (iii) the third one, Lg = 0, φ 
= 0, is stable. In this case there are multiple equilibria and a coordination problem arises. Both 
state intervention and, as we argue, private efforts can be effective in improving business 
environment and enforceability of property rights. 
  12The last case allows improvement in property rights enforcement by firms' actions, so we 
concentrate our attention on this. Here multiple equilibria exist because, given that the share of 
total output appropriated by the guerrilla movement depends on the number of guerrillas, the 
aggregate production function can be convex in L. However, at the firm level φ is given and the 
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Recall that φ′  < 0, φ′′  ≤ 0 and G(1) = 0. So, from equation (7a) it follows that, for 
high levels of L, the aggregate production function is convex in 
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 < 0. Thus, if the share of workers devoting their time to 
appropriative activities is small, an increase in wages generates a rise in the number of workers in 
legal jobs and reduces the number of guerrillas. 
  13Note also that, in the case of two stable equilibria, the wage is higher in the high-income 
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is higher in the high-income equilibrium. Now, based on equation (5) 











) 1 )( 1 (
, the 





) 1 ( 1







This condition holds for any reasonable value of φ. Note that the right-hand side of the 
inequality increases as φ grows, so if given α the condition holds for φ
~
 then it holds for any φ > 
. Note also that the right-hand side of the condition grows as α decreases, so if given φ the 
condition holds for 
φ
~
α ~ then it holds for any α < α ~. Now consider α =0.5 and φ  = 0.0001. In this 
case the right-hand side of the condition is equal to 0.50027, so the condition holds for any φ ≥ 
0.0001 and any α < 0.5. 
Thus, if the economy is in the low-income, low-wage equilibrium, a general increase in 
wages can drive the economy to the high-income, high-wage equilibrium. However, no single 
profit-maximizing firm can increase wages and attract more workers alone because no single firm 
is able to affect the ratio 
N
L
































< 0, from equation (7) it follows that the marginal 
productivity of labor is higher than the wage, so an increase in wages would be socially desirable 
but the market cannot drive the economy to the high-income, high-wage equilibrium. 
  14In summary, the marginal productivity of labor decreases for each firm, but in the 
aggregate it might increase because the number of workers is negatively correlated with the 
number of guerrillas. Consequently, the share of output that is appropriated by guerrillas depends 
negatively on the number of workers and, given the constant population of potential workers any 
increase in the wages of legal workers generates a reduction in the number of guerrillas. Under 
such circumstances, two equilibria may arise: one low-income, low-wage equilibrium with 
guerrilla activity and one peaceful, high-income, high-wage equilibrium. Any policy designed to 
decrease the share of output appropriated and, consequently increase the actual marginal 
productivity of legal work will reduce the number of guerrillas (see equations (5) and (5a)). 
Therefore, strengthening legal institutions or increasing social expenditure can help achieve the 
high-income, high-wage equilibrium. Our goal here, however, is not to engage in the debate on 
government policies that promote the peaceful, high-income, high-wage equilibrium but rather to 
show that there are private paths leading to enhanced enforceability of property rights, reduced 
inequality and social conflict.  
We argue that private agents can help obtain the same outcome as complex and centrally-
controlled institutional reforms that aim at improving law enforcement or reducing social 
inequalities. Firms can improve the business climate by raising wages, but one can argue that no 
single firm has incentives to implement this policy alone because it would increase its costs 
without noticeably improving the country-wide business climate. However, if private firms have 
incentives to change the compensation scheme in such a way that worker’s earnings grow (for 
example, better controlling the principal-agent problem), then coordination will not be an issue. 
  15 
A Private Path to Prosperity 
Efficiency Wages 
    We consider a version of the efficiency wages model (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) 
where the outside option of a worker is not unemployment but a guerrilla movement. If shirking 
incurred no cost, workers might shirk but, if caught, the cost might be job loss.
5
For simplicity, we assume that each worker supplies one unit of labor. If he shirks, the 
actual supply of labor is ∂ < 1. So, we can define total factor productivity A as follows: 
If workers do not shirk     A AH=
If workers do shirk    ∂ = A AL
    Therefore total factor productivity (TFP) depends on the workers effort: if they shirk, 
TFP is  and if workers do not shirk TFP is  , where  <  .  L A H A L A H A
    In this setting, if supervision were cost-free, each firm could offer two different 
contracts, one for shirkers and one for good workers. The only difference between these contracts 
would be the wage: 
a
H H k A a w ) 1 ( − =  and  . 
a
L L k A a w ) 1 ( − =
Since both capital income and labor income are higher when the productivity is high, 
, capital owners and workers prefer the first contract. However, if there is incomplete 




  16Following the traditional model of shirking, we assume a shirker can be caught and fired 
with probability p and once the worker is fired he joins a guerrilla movement where he earns . 
Since we consider a static set-up, the non-shirking condition determines that the expected income 
he receives when shirking is lower than the income he receives when he does not shirk: 
, where e is the monetary value that the worker assigns to the disutility of 
effort. If we rearrange this, the non-shirking condition becomes: 
g w




w + >  
This policy works if 0 < p < 1. If p = 1, this is the case of perfect information and there is 
no need to use efficiency wages. If p = 0 workers are never fired, so in equilibrium  .  L w w =
Note that this policy works at the firm level as long as guerrilla movement exists. In other 
words, if every firm follows the same policy, productivity grows and labor demand increases so 
much that guerrillas disappear, but then the efficiency wages mechanism does not work anymore 
because the outside option is not a guerrilla movement but another firm. Therefore, if all firms 
choose w = , a new equilibrium where  = 0 can arise. However, TFP will be   because 
without guerilla efficiency wages are a useless incentive mechanism. In any case, since in the 
low-income, low-wage equilibrium actual TFP is given by (1-φ) and the new equilibrium has 
shirking but no appropriation (no guerrilla), efficiency wages finally lead to an increase in TFP. 
H w g L L A
L A
                                                                                                                                                              
5 Note that if we consider the possibility of unemployment in addition to the existence of a guerilla movement 
nothing will change as long as the income of the guerilla is higher than the income of an unemployed worker.  
  17Note also that this mechanism may fail to eliminate the conflict if the new wage is not 
high enough. Indeed, if   then the equilibrium wage changes but not the ratio 1 w wH < N
L
. But 
then, how big has the increase in TFP to be in order to eliminate social conflict? 
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The required (threshold) increase in productivity depends positively on the share that 
guerrillas appropriate. In addition, the income of guerrillas depends on their efficiency and for 
this reason, the bigger the efficiency of guerrilla groups the harder to attract workers to legal jobs.   
Similarly, the required increase in productivity depends negatively on the share of 
workers. Therefore, holding the rest constant, an increase in the number of workers affects the 
threshold both directly and indirectly : First, directly,  it reduces the marginal productivity of 
labor and increases the threshold change in productivity. Second, indirectly, it decreases the 
appropriated share and, consequently, decreases the threshold change in productivity. The net 








φ  (See Section A2 in the Appendix for complete 
derivation). 
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condition for the increase in productivity to eliminate conflict. Therefore, there exists a critical 






































H , so that 
efficiency wages effectively eliminate conflict. 
Discussion and conclusions 
Using a general equilibrium model where workers can either work or join guerilla groups, 
we show that if all firms had incentives to pay higher wages to their workers then guerilla 
movements would no longer exist. However, guerrilla movements are real and many landowners 
in zones with guerrilla presence pay the minimum legal wage or less (Andonova and Zuleta, 
2006). This might be either because some firms have no private incentives to increase wages or 
because some landowners are not aware of the potential gains derived from efficiency wages
6. 
Both reasons seem plausible.  
In fact, environments where property rights are not enforceable are typically characterized 
by strong stereotypes for both owners and workers. This situation is particularly challenging in 
Latin America where workers and capital owners are perceived as class enemies as a result of the 
traditional rivalry between them during the industrialization period (Elvira and Davila, 2005). 
This type of cultural specificity might interfere with the feasibility of compensation policies that 
align the interest of different social groups because these might be incompatible with local 
cultural and historical specificities (Elvira and Davila, 2005; Montaño, 1991).  
                                                 
6 Guerrilla warfare is a predominantly rural phenomenon. Urban guerrilla groups are generally less frequent possibly 
because law-enforcing institutions are usually stronger and more effective in cities than in rural areas.  
  19        The  main  implication  of  this  paper  is that the behavior of private agents can play a 
determining role in the solution of economic conflicts and the reduction of economic inequality. 
In particular, the compensation schemes implemented by private firms can improve their 
workers’ conditions and, consequently, increase the opportunity costs of illegal activities, 
reducing economic inequality. The adoption of production technologies and crops that aggravate 
principal-agent problems within firms can provide incentives for implementing efficiency wages 
and thus, indirectly, can increase the opportunity cost of illegal activities. Eventually, the solution 
of economic conflicts and poverty reduction may be as much in the hands of the government and 
its law enforcement institutions as in the hands of private entrepreneurs who, by actively 
managing principal-agent problems, can protect their assets against expropriation and improve 
worker’s economic conditions.   
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Therefore, if the changes in the number of guerrillas strongly affect the appropriated share 
then an increase in the number of workers (decrease in the number of guerrillas) reduces the 
needed increase in productivity. Recall that an increase in the number of workers reduces both 
  25the marginal productivity of labor and the appropriated share so the net effect depends the slope 
of the function  ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
N
L
φ . 
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